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COMMENT
The American Models of Technology Transfer:
Contextualized Emulation by Developing Countries?
BENTON C. MARTINt
INTRODUCTION

The patenting of innovative technology has become an essential part
of the U.S. economy, promoted by groundbreaking legislation that allows
ownership of technology resulting from research funded by the federal
government.' Prior to legislation, less than four percent of the tens of
thousands of government-funded inventions were licensed to industry,
2
resulting in many technologies failing to reach practical application.
Currently, multiple types of research institutions in the United States
negotiate an increasing number of licenses every year, resulting in the
issuance of more patents and the disclosure of more inventions to
technology transfer offices. 3 Even scholars who believe this growth would
have occurred eventually without the Bayh-Dole Act (Bayh-Dole) agree
that the legislation was important because it "accelerated this growth by
clarifying ownership rules, by making these activities bureaucratically
easier to administer,
and by changing norms toward patenting and licensing
4
universities."
at
t J.D. Candidate, 2010, Emory University School of
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I Irene Ribeiro Dubowy, Subsidies Code, TRIPs Agreement, and Technological
Development: Some Considerationfor Developing Countries, 8 J.TECH. L. & POL'Y 33, 57-

59 (2003) (discussing the Bayh-Dole Act, affecting universities, and the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act, affecting government laboratories, as being the driving factor in
making patents a "pillar" of the U.S. economy).
2 Sen. Birch Bayh, Bayh-Dole: Don't Turn Back The Clock, Address at the Licensing
Executives Society 2006 Annual Meeting, (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://www.lesi.
org/BirchBayh/Bayh.pdf.
3 AUTM, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.autm.net/AM/Template.cfm?
Section=FAQs (last visited Apr. 20, 2009) (listing statistics of the increases in licensing,
patenting, and invention disclosures).
4 Anthony D. So et al., Is Bayh-Dole Good for Developing Countries? Lessons From
the US Experience, 10 PLoS BIOLOGY 2078, 2079 (2008), availableat http://biology.plos
journals.org/archive/15457-885/6/10/pdf/l 0.137 ljournal.pbio.0060262L.pdf.
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Clarification of intellectual property ownership has had a substantially
beneficial effect on the U.S. economy; many developed and developing
5
countries are considering adopting or have already adopted the U.S. model.
Many countries have adopted similar provisions, including a majority of
European countries, China, Korea, South Africa,6 Brazil, and Malaysia.7
Many developing countries have special concerns relating to Bayh-Dole,
specifically, as critics mention, varying degrees of low resources devoted to
research funding, lack of "practically oriented universities," and less
8
established patent systems than the United States.
Granting permission to research institutions to take title and sell
technologies to private industry, with a mandate to bring to practical
application, was the creative solution Bayh-Dole introduced to fix the
problem of government funded technologies sitting on a shelf and not
finding practical application. 9 Considering many in research institutions or
industry do not have sufficient resources to fund projects and bring the
technologies to practical application, it is questionable whether many
countries even have the prerequisite problem Bayh-Dole sought to fix.
However, many developed countries are beginning to use government funds
for research and to prevent the problems Bayh-Dole addressed, attempting
"to achieve similar economic success through effectively utilizing the
outputs of publicly funded research." 10
While some critics feel that instituting Bayh-Dole would create a
greater burden due to over-patenting and high costs, I I others scholars feel
that the base strategy of clarification of ownership is important for
developing countries who seek to increase government funding to research
institutions and want the technology produced to be brought to practical

5 Michael S. Mireles, The Bayh-Dole Act and Incentives for the Commercialization of
Government-Funded Invention in Developing Countries, 76 UMKC L. REV. 525, 525 (2007)
("Numerous developing and developed countries are considering adopting or have adopted
legislation similar to the U.S. Bayh-Dole Act.").
6 Helen Davison, Public-Private Partnerships: The Role of IPRs, http://www.
stockholm-network.org/downloads/events/HelenDavison.pdf (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
7 So et al., supra note 4, at 2078.
8 Id. at 2082 (mentioning the reasons that Bayh-Dole legislation would likely fail to

have the same success in developing countries that it has had in the United States).
9 See Bayh, supra note 2 (describing the original problem Bayh-Dole sought to
address).
10 Eugene Lottering, Pending Intellectual Property Legislation, Based on the Bayh-Dole

Act of the USA, Should Help Accelerate South Africa's Journey Towards a KnowledgeBased Economy, in INNOVATION FUND ANNUAL REPORT 2006/07, at 6 (2007) (annual report
of a group working on Bayh-Dole type legislation in South Africa).
II So et al., supra note 4, at 2082 ("Based on our review above, we believe it is doubtful
that the benefits of legislation closely modeled on BD would outweigh their costs in
developing counties.").
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application by industry. 12 However, even proponents agree that if BayhDole is to be adopted in developing countries, it must "move beyond" just
clarification of ownership to provide a more socially beneficial national
innovation policy. 13 Despite criticism, developing countries are likely to
continue to attempt and emulate the success of U.S. legislation, especially
as countries progress to a point where they are considering federal funding
of research. For this reason, it is important to study U.S. legislation to
understand how developing countries might realize its positive effects of
accelerating practical application of government funded research by
utilizing industry. Even more important perhaps is the study of potential
safeguards, contextualized to the particular developing country, which
could be built into legislation without sacrificing the positive benefits of the
Bayh-Dole legislation.
In looking at American technology transfer, it is important to note that
different legislation has stimulated technology transfer in universities than
technology transfer in government laboratories, and accordingly, the
practice of technology transfer in these two entities differs. 14 As foreign
governments look to the United States as a model system, it is important for
them to understand these differences and enact legislation that will be the
15
most beneficial for their country's unique history, structure, and goals.
The differences in the regulations for the two types of U.S. institutions
should encourage developing countries to focus on the specifics of their
unique institutions and create legislation appropriate for their unique needs.
A few commentators have examined the regulations of university and small
business technology transfer and have drawn conclusions on which aspects
are beneficial for developing countries, 16 but no commentator has
thoroughly examined the successful aspects of the more highly regulated
12 Sara Boettiger & Alan Bennett, The Bayh-Dole Act: Implications for Developing
Countries, 46 IDEA 261, 278 (2006) ("The Bayh- Dole Act fundamentally served to create
clarity of ownership of inventions created in the public sector with public funds. This has
been the major positive effect of the Act that should be emulated in national policy.").
13 Id. at 278 ("The adoption of new policy today needs to move beyond Bayh- Dole and
the question of IP ownership to provide frameworks for IP management that foster broad

innovation.").
14 See generally Jack E. Kerrigan & Christopher J. Brasco, The Technology Transfer
Revolution: Legislative History and Future Proposal, 31 PUB. CONT. L.J. 277 (2002)
(discussing key differences in the legislation controlling government laboratories and

universities).
15 See Michael S. Mireles, Adoption of the Bayh-Dole Act in Developed Countries:
Added Pressure for a Broad Research Exemption in the United States, 59 ME. L. REV. 259,
261 (2007) (arguing that the Bayh-Dole Act may not be successful in Europe and Japan
"because of the differences in the history, practice, and structure of most European and
Japanese university systems compared with the U.S. university system.").
16 See Mireles, supra note 5, at 281 (examining the Bayh-Dole Act and the implications
to developing countries when adopting a similar provision); Boettiger & Bennett, supra note

12, at 525 (same).
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government agency laboratories to evaluate their potential if adopted by
developing countries. Perhaps commentators have overlooked this model of
American technology transfer because developing countries have a low
percentage of research funded by government and accordingly a low
number of government funded laboratories. 17 Some of the distinct
provisions warrant closer examination, especially since some developing
countries are characterized by an increased level of regulations.
Furthermore, no commentary has emphasized how the need for different
legislation for different types of institutions within the United States is an
example of how developing countries must similarly tailor their legislation
to the distinct organization of their research institution and their country's
unique objectives.
This Comment will address differences between technology transfer
licensing practices in U.S. government laboratories compared to
universities, arguing that understanding the need to focus on the specific
needs of research institutions and their relationship to the specific country's
government is integral to coherent national technology transfer legislation.
Part I of this Comment examines the important legislation that has affected
technology transfer in universities and governmental laboratories and
examines how this legislation has evolved based on the unique needs of the
different institutions. Part II uses two examples, Emory University and the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to describe noticeable
differences in how licensing works in practice in each type of entity.
Finally, Part III analyzes, based on the differences described, the
importance of legislation contextualized to the specific country. This final
Part proposes which beneficial aspects of the American models developing
countries should preserve. It also looks at some specific problems faced by
developing countries, such as access to life-saving technology for lowincome populations, prevention of anti-commons, and lack of technology
transfer resources, and analyzes legislative provisions that could modify the
American model to contextualize legislation to address the unique needs of
the particular country.

I. HISTORY ON THE TECH TRANSFER LEGISLATION

In 1980, the U.S. legislature passed two pieces of legislation aimed at

increasing the effectiveness of commercializing technological innovation

17 See Sonja van

Renssen,

Innovation in South Africa: too much, too soon?,

SCIDEV.NET, Apr. 6, 2006, http://www.scidev.net/en/sub-suharan-africa/features/innovationin-south-africa-too-much-too-soon.html (stating that "some 70 percent of research in South
Africa is funded by industry, not government").
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funded by the federal government. 18 Overall, these initiatives are hailed as
one of the greatest successes in U.S. legislation, due to their beneficial
effect in helping technology transfer to become a key part of the American
economy. 19 As noted previously, as a model for developing countries,
commentators criticize the legislation as being merely supplementary to the
increased growth already occurring in the United States, 2" but this
Comment recognizes that many developing countries are adopting this type
of legislation in anticipation of increased development. One key piece of
legislation, the Bayh-Dole Act, applies to U.S. universities, small
businesses, and non-profits. 2 1 The other piece of legislation, the StevensonWydler Technology Innovation Act (Stevenson-Wydler) applies to
governmental agency research laboratories. 22 Legislators enacted each
piece of legislation based on the particular structure of the institution and
the unique relationship each has with the government. This Part will
examine the legislative history and subsequent amendments to Bayh-Dole
and Stevenson-Wydler in order to emphasis the need in the United States to
contextualize its technology transfer legislation.
A. Universities:Bayh-Dole Act
Bayh-Dole is viewed as a success in the United States in fulfilling its
purpose of commercializing the results of government-funded research and
has been called "[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be
enacted in America over the past half-century." 23 According to one of the
Act's authors, Birch Bayh, prior to the Act's passage "the U.S. government
owned approximately 28,000 patents, [but] less than 4 percent were
licensed to industry." 24 Since the Act's passage in 1980, "there has been a
substantial increase in the number of government-funded inventions that
have been patented and licensed by universities," largely attributed to Act's
influence. 2 5 As reported by a website tracking university technology
18 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 279-80 ("Congress passed two acts in 1980
that shaped the law of government technology transfer for the years to come: (1) the BayhDole Act, and (2) the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act. Although both statutes
were enacted to foster technology transfer ... ").
19 See, e.g., Innovation's Golden Goose, THE ECONOMIST, Dec 12, 2002, at 3 (calling
one of the pieces of legislation "[p]ossibly the most inspired piece of legislation to be

enacted in America over the past half-century .....
20 So et al., supra note 4, at 2078.
21 37 C.F.R. § 401 (2000) (implementing 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212).
22 Stevenson-Wydler Innovation Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3710 (2006).

23 Chester G. Moore, Killing the Bayh-Dole Act's Golden Goose, 8 TUL. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 151, 156 (2006) (citing Innovation's Golden Goose, supra note 19, at 3).
24

Bayh, supra note 2.

25 Michael S. Mireles, Jr., States as Innovation System Laboratories: California,
Patents, and Stem Cell Technology, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1133, 1152 (2006) (citing H.R.
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transfer "between FY 1991 and FY 2004, annual invention disclosures
increased more than 290 percent (to 18,178), new patents filed increased
nearly 450 percent (to 11,089) and new licenses and options executed
increased about 510 percent (to 5,329). " 26 Universities' technology transfer
offices have flourished within the framework it created and the only
amendment to the Act, in 1984, granted large corporations the benefits of
27
Bayh-Dole.
However, the Act is not without its critics. 2 8 One criticism of the Act
is the use of "march-in rights" as the primary means of protecting the public
interest. 29 The Act gives the government the right to require compulsory
licensing of inventions under limited circumstances if needed to protect the
public interest. 30 The government is permitted to require a research
institution "to grant a nonexclusive, partially exclusive, or exclusive license
in any field of use to a responsible" third party licensee if the governmental
agency which funded the research determines that "action is necessary
because the [original licensee] has not taken, or is not expected to take
within a reasonable time, effective steps to achieve practical application of
the subject invention in such field of use, action is necessary to alleviate
health or safety needs which are not reasonably satisfied by the [original
licensee], [or] action is necessary to meet requirements for public use
specified by Federal regulations and such requirements are not reasonably
satisfied by the contractor, assignee, or licensees." 3 1 During the adoption of
Bayh-Dole, opponents argued that in practice these rights would never be
used.32 This has turned out to true: despite multiple attempts, "the
33
[government] has never exercised its march-in rights."
The other provision aimed at providing access to the public allows the
government to retain title to a technology "in exceptional circumstances
when the agency determines that restriction or elimination of the right to
Res. 319, 109th Cong. (2006)).
26 AUTM, supra note 3.
27 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1685-87

(1996).
28 See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998) (discussing the
"tragedy of the anticommons").

29 See Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don't We Enforce Existing Drug Price
Controls?, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631, 658 (2001) (agreeing that opponents' objection that march-

in rights would never be used has turned out to be true).
30 Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 261-62 ("Under very limited circumstances,
the Act also allowed for 'march-in' rights, under which the government can require the
compulsory licensing of a patent.").
31 35 U.S.C. § 203 (2006).
32 Arno & Davis, supra note 29, at 658.
33 Id.
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retain title to any subject invention will better promote the policy and
objectives of this chapter." 34 Like march-in rights, the government rarely
uses this "exceptional circumstances" provision and scholars argue that
more inventions would stay in the public domain if legislators modified the
provision. 35 It is important to note that both access provisions, "march-in"
rights, and the "exceptional circumstances" also regulate governmental
laboratory licensing.
Another aspect of Bayh-Dole that is relevant to our focus is the fact
that it does not exempt "experiment use" from patent infringement. This
means that researchers cannot use technology to research new inventions
without licensing the technology, which potentially makes it more difficult
to discover new inventions due to the cost of licensing and fear of
infringement. There is also no research exemption in the Stevenson-Wydler
Technology Innovation Act, as discussed in sub-Part B.
B. Government Labs: Stevenson- Wydler Technology Innovation Act
Passed prior to Bayh-Dole, Stevenson-Wydler's purpose was similar
to Bayh-Dole in that it encouraged government laboratories to take an
active role in technology transfer, requiring money to be set aside for
technology transfer activities. 36 However, commentators argue that7
3
Stevenson-Wydler initially provided more flexibility than Bayh-Dole.
Critics of Bayh-Dole argue that while Bayh-Dole sought to remove the
federal government from the technology transfer equation, StevensonWydler sought to "engage federal agencies actively in the process of
technology transfer in cases where there was no contractor to take charge of
38
this mission itself."

Unlike with Bayh-Dole, Congress has needed to significantly amend
Stevenson-Wydler to help the Act fulfill its proposed purpose, due largely
to the unique aspects of technology transfer from a government owned
laboratory. 39 Commentators suggest that Steven-Wydler needed these
34

35

35 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2006).
Mireles, supra note 25, at 1160 (explaining commentator stances on modifying Bayh-

Dole).
36 FED. LAB. CONSORTIUM FOR TECH. TRANSFER, FLC ORTA HANDBOOK, at A-2 (2007)
[hereinafter ORTA HANDBOOK] ("The law requires laboratories to take an active role in
technical cooperation and to set apart a percentage of the laboratory budget specifically for
technology transfer activities.").
37 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 279-80 ("The Stevenson-Wydler Act
provided substantially more flexibility than the Bayh-Dole Act ....).
38 Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 1706 (warning against over-patenting of government
funded technologies).
39 Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 281 ("By failing to give federal laboratories
clear legal authority to enter into such agreements, the Stevenson-Wydler Act catalyzed few
technology transfers.").
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amendments to be successful in allowing commercialization of technologies
from government laboratories in the same way Bayh-Dole allowed
commercialization of technology from university laboratories. 40 The first
amendment to Stevenson-Wydler was actually passed within Bayh-Dole; an
amendment that allowed government owned and operated laboratories to
issue exclusive licenses to commercial entities, which was included in a
different provision of the Act affecting universities, due to the special
regulations that had to be laid out due to the limited powers of the federal
government.

41

The next major amendment came in 1986 through the Federal
Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (FTTA).4 2 The FTTA sought to require
federal laboratory scientists to "consider technology transfer an individual
responsibility" by including it in performance review and allowing
employees to share in royalties. 4 3 The Act also made the important
distinction that "enabled cooperative research and development agreements
(so-called 'CRADAs') between government owned laboratories, industry,
and academia ....-44 A CRADA is an agreement "between one or more

Federal laboratories and one or more non-Federal parties ...toward the
conduct of specified research or development efforts which are consistent
with the missions of the laboratory .

.

.

."45

CRADAs are the only

mechanism by which the government can grant patent licenses on an
46
employee's technology in advance of invention.
Unlike universities, government owned and operated laboratories
could not previously receive funds from outside institutions due their nature
as a branch of the federal government. CRADAs allows contribution of
private funds to government funded research projects 47 -this has been
attributed as one of the main successes of government laboratory
technology transfer. 48 CRADAs have become the "technology transfer
40 See id. at 280 ("The Bayh-Dole Act was less successful primarily because of its
burdensome public notice requirements, the limited class of beneficiaries under the Act, and
the fact that recently proposed amendments to Stevenson-Wydler and its progeny will likely
incorporate the most beneficial components of the Bayh-Dole Act.").

41

See ORTA

42

15 U.S.C. §§ 1501-1534 (2006).

43

ORTA

HANDBOOK,

HANDBOOK,

supra note 36.

supra note 36.

44 Mark R. Wisner, Proposed Changes to the Laws Governing Ownership of Inventions

Made with FederalFunding, 2 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 193, 193 (1994).
45 15 U.S.C. § 3710a(d)(l) (1994).
46 Kathleen Sybert, Kay Etzler & Ron G. King, Government Funding and Research
Development Collaborations with Biotech

Companies, in Biotechnology

Law 2002:

& BUSINESS STRATEGIES 749, 785 (Practicing Law Inst., 2002).
one of the few mechanisms that the Federal government has to
receive non-appropriated funds from the private sector.").
48 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 279-80 (describing the importance of
CRADAs in making federal laboratories more successful than Universities at technology
BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS
47 Id. ("CRADAs are
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vehicle of choice." 4 9 There is potential for creative, contextualized use of
CRADAs in developing countries to allow private-public partnerships to
fund research on neglected disease and, in return, gain limited control over
50
the type of license issued on the technology.
In addition to the FTTA, Steven-Wydler was also amended by the
National Competitiveness Technology Transfer Act of 1989,1 which
"extended the Stevenson-Wydler Act to government owned, contractor
operated federal laboratories," 52 and the Emerging Technologies and
Advanced Technology Program Amendments Act of 1991," "which
created an Advanced Technology Program which worked with specific
industry investors to the Program to sponsor new technologies."5 4 The
effect of these amendments was to define which entities would get the
power granted in the FTTA, since these organizations also performed
research funded by the federal government. 5 5 It is important to note that in
including these entities under the umbrella of Stevenson-Wydler, Congress
made a judgment call that these institutions were similar to government
owned and operated research laboratories than small businesses or
universities.
A few more recent amendments specific to Stevenson-Wydler show
the need to allow technology transfer legislation to evolve around the
individual structure and circumstances of the particular institution. First,
Congress enacted the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act
of 199556 as a response to complaints that CRADAs were taking too long to
negotiate because the licensing laws were too flexible (sometimes in excess
of one year). 57 The Act grants "assurance" to corporations that they will

transfer).
49 Barbara A. Duncombe, Federal Technology Transfer, 37 FED. B. NEWS & J. 608, 610

(1990).
50 See generally Nathaniel Lipkus, How to Understand Product Development: PublicPrivate Partnershipsas VehiclesfJr Innovation in CombatingNeglected Diseases, 10 MICH.
ST. U. J. MED. & L. 385 (2006) (discussing the potential for public-private partnerships to
address neglected diseases in the context of America's modem intellectual property
environment, which includes CRADAs as an integral part).
51 15 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3718 (2006) (amending the Stevenson-Wydler Technology
Innovation Act).
52 Wisner, supra note 44, at 193.
53 Emerging Technologies and Advanced Technology Program Amendments Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-245, 106 Stat. 1992.
54 Wisner, supra note 44, at 193.
55 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 283-86 (describing the "definitional stage"
of technology transfer history which followed the "incentive stage" when CRADAs were
created).
56 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-113,
110 Stat. 1996.
57 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 285.
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have sufficient intellectual property rights under CRADAs. 5 8 The Act also
"gives the collaborating party in a CRADA the right to choose an exclusive
or nonexclusive license for a prenegotiated field of use for an invention
resulting from joint research under a CRADA. ' 5 9 In 1995, Congress
enacted the Technology Transfer Improvements Act to provide safeguards
against corporation abuse. "The Act provided any party holding an
exclusive license to a CRADA invention could be required to transfer its
license to a third party in exceptional circumstances, such as when a
transfer is necessary to secure health and safety needs" and also that "the
Govemment retained the right to a nonexclusive, non-transferable,
irrevocable, paid-up license to practice the invention by or on behalf of the
Government for government purposes." 60 Finally, the Technology Transfer
Commercialization Act of 2000 61 required exclusive or partially exclusive
licensees "to provide a plan for development and/or marketing of the
invention and to make a commitment to achieve a practical application of
the invention within a reasonable period of time," exempting inventions
made under CRADA. 62 This Act also highlighted the continued need to
lessen the negotiation time for CRADAs by creating clear regulations of
ownership, requiring the use of successful provisions from Bayh-Dole to
63
further streamline the negotiation process.
II. How TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OFFICES LICENSE IN PRACTICE
In practice, the technology transfer procedures of government
laboratories and universities differ in many aspects. Ultimately, it is these
practical aspects that exemplify the need for developing countries to adopt
policies contextualized to their particular government and research
institutional structure. It is important to note that federal government
laboratories are fundamentally more limited than those of universities, due
64
to the government's limited powers in comparison to private industry.

58 ORTA HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at A-4.

59 Id.
Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 285-86.
61 Pub. L. No. 106-404, 114 Stat. 2000.
62 ORTA HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at A-4; see also 35 U.S.C. § 209 (2006).
63 Hearing on the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Research Programs: Before
60

the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, Comm. on Veterans' Affairs, U.S. H. Rep.,
107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (2002) (statement of Benjamin H. Wu, Deputy Under Secretary for

Technology), available at http://www.ogc.doc.gov/ogc/legreg/testimon/107s/wu09l9.htm
("The law sought to remove the procedural obstacles and, to the greatest extent possible, the
uncertainty involved in the licensing of Federally patented inventions created in a
Government-owned, Government-operated (GOGO) laboratory. This was achieved by
applying the successful Bayh-Dole Act provisions to a GOGO.").
64 E-mail from Andrew Watkins (Nov. 5, 2008) (on file with author).
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This Part will use specific examples, Emory University and the CDC, to
examine how technology transfer operates at these two institutions in
practice.
Universities: Case Study: Emory University

A.

Started in 1985, Emory University's Technology Transfer Office has
been more successful than many university tech transfer offices, having
earned over 760 million dollars through 2008 from commercializing Emory
inventions. 65 One of the office's biggest success stories is a 525 million
dollar deal with Gilead Sciences and Royalty Pharma for an HIV drug
developed by one of the school's researchers. 66 Gilead had plans for an
Access Program in place for the drug, but was initially unsuccessful due to
the poorly designed infrastructure of the drug access program. 67 After
advocacy groups heavily criticized the failure of Gilead's plan, the
company responded by taking more aggressive steps to ensure that the drug
would be available, including issuing non-exclusive licenses and providing
information for generic manufacturers. 68 Emory responded by working with
student groups calling for better access policies to draft new access
guidelines for future deals. 6 9 This is an impressive step, but these access
guidelines are not legally binding and one could envision compromise in
the face of well-financed corporate pressure.
In spite of these shortcomings, the Office is clearly proficient in the
practice of technology transfer, assisting Emory University with the
education of researchers about technology transfer, evaluation of new
inventions for commercialization potential, protection of intellectual
property, marketing of protected technology, license negotiation, license
monitoring, collection of distribution of licensing proceeds, facilitation of
start-up companies, and other administrative duties related to technology
transfer at the university. 70 One distinctive feature of small business and

65

EMORY UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. TRANSFER, ANNUAL REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2008, at

6

(2008), available at http://www.ott.emory.edu/Office/Facts-andFigures/ OTT%20FY08%
20Annual%20Web.pdf.
66 David Wahlberg, Emory to Get $525 Million, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONST., July 19,
2005, at Al.
67 David P. Hamilton, A 'Good Deed' For AIDS Drug Hits Obstacles, WALL ST. J., June
30, 2006, at B 1.
68

K.

BOWLER ET AL., ENSURING ACCESS THROUGH UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:

A CASE STUDY OF THE EMORY-GILEAD EMTRICITABINE DEAL (2006), available at www.

essentialmedicine.org/conferenceblog/wp.content/uploads/presentations/U4EM%20Poster-%
20Emory-gilead%2OCase%20study.pdf.
69

EMORY

UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. TRANSFER, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER FOR GLOBAL

ACCESS: GUIDING PRINCIPLES (2008), available at hup://www.ott.emory.edu/Forinventors/

Policies/EmoryGlobal AccessPrinciples.pdf.
70 See Emory Univ. Office of Tech. Transfer, Overview, http://www.ott.emory.edu/Off
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university technology transfer that is obvious from Emory's technology
transfer program is the ability to create start-up companies based around
new technology, which may allow for easy transition to market for some
university technologies. 7 1 Emory has created a program called Emory
VentureLab which "is a start-up assistance program established by the
Office of Technology Transfer to shepherd Emory discoveries to market
through new venture creation and development." 72 The Emory technology
transfer website promotes various start-up business incubators and
73
publicizes Emory's success technology start-up ventures.
A "ready to sign" non-exclusive licensing agreement for
Norepinephrine Transporter cDNA, one of several such agreements
available at the Office of Technology Transfer's website, provides for
termination if the license is breached and that the license is "conditional
upon and subject to the U.S. Government Licenses and other rights retained
by the United States in inventions developed by nonprofit institutions with
the support of federal funds." 74 It notes that these rights are "set forth in 35
USCA § 201 et seq. and 37 CFR 401 et seq.," 75 but does not explicitly
describe the government's march-in rights. This portion refers to a section
of the Bayh-Dole Act which allows the federal agency that provided
funding for the technology to require that a license be granted to a
responsible applicant if the current licensee did not effectively bring the
technology to practical application within a reasonable time or if action is
needed to solve a "health or safety" issue and was not "reasonably satisfied"
76
by the current licensee.
B.

Government Laboratories:Case Study: CDC

In many ways, CDC's Technology Transfer Office is functionally
similar to Emory University's Technology Transfer Office, working to
evaluate, patent, market, and license new technology. 77 Similar to Emory's
office, the CDC office deals with monitoring and collecting money from
ice/AboutUs/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).

71 See Emory Univ. Office of Tech. Transfer, Venture Lab, http://www.ott.emory.edu/
VentureLab/General/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 20, 2009).
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 EMORY UNIV. OFFICE OF TECH. TRANSFER, NON-EXCLUSIVE LICENSE AGREEMENT FOR
HUMAN NOREPINEPHRINE TRANSPORTER-EXPRESSING CELL LINE AND cDNA 3, http://

www.ott.emory.edu/ForIndustry/ReadytoSignAgreements/EmoryRSA_96064.pdf (last
visited Mar. 20, 2009).
75 Id.
35 U.S.C. § 203(l)(a) (2006).

76

77 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., CDCOCSO Tech Transfer: Overview, http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/techTran/overview.
htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2009).
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ongoing licenses. 78 According to the director of technology transfer at the
CDC, the largest difference in federal government technology transfer is the
fact that there is less flexibility since the federal government has limited
power compared to the private sector. 79 For example, universities can take
equity in start up companies in exchange for university technology, while
regulations prohibit government owned and operated laboratories from
executing this type of technology transfer deal. 80 Researchers in
government laboratories are also limited in their ability to work for
entrepreneurial private enterprises and receive honoraria for serving on the
boards of start up companies. 8 1 In spite of these restrictions, commentators
hail the process used in government laboratories as successful for
decreasing negotiation time for technology transfer agreements.8 2 The CDC
also acknowledges, because of its nature as a government agency, that it is
able to perform research directed toward the public benefit and government
interest, with profitability as a less demanding goal than it may be at
university technology transfer offices. 83 The remainder of this sub-Part will
discuss additional important distinctions that affect federal laboratories
licensing.
The first important distinction that is apparent in the CDC licensing
procedure is the encouragement of CRADAs as a means to gain access to
technology. 84 While universities can enter into collaborative agreements
without much restriction, government laboratories are unable to obtain
funds from outside sources without the enabling legislation allowing
CRADAs. 8 5 The CDC website explains that the "primary difference
between CRADAs and other CDC research contracts and agreements is that
CRADAs provide the collaborator with an advance option to negotiate an
exclusive license to inventions made under the CRADA" and this
"exclusivity gives the commercial partner an advantage in the marketplace
along with a window of opportunity for full development and marketing of

78

See id.

79 Watkins, supra note 64.
80

Id.

81 Id.
82 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 285-86.
83 Watkins, supra note 64 (stating the greatest benefit of licensing from government

laboratories compared to university licensing schemes is "our technologies tend to be less
early-stage than those of universities and they are often directed more to public health or
public economic needs"). Dr. Watkins also added that "[m]uch of the research at a Federal

lab is targeted to research areas or multi-disciplinary or multi-industry needs that are not
feasible for universities or companies to pursue." Id.
84 See Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Dept. of Health & Human Servs., CDCOSCO Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), http://www.cdc.
gov/od/science/techtran/crads.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
85 Sybert, Etzler, & King, supra note 46, at 785.
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86
the resulting product."

The Director of the CDC's Technology Transfer Office seems to view
CRADAs as a limiting factor in federal technology transfer, claiming
universities "engage much more easily in sponsored research with
commercial entities, many of which do not require any intellectual
collaboration from the company," while most federal agencies "are limited
to collaborative research with commercial partners via the Cooperative
Research and Development Agreement." 87 However, private industry
requested this type of inflexibility, as according to Jack E. Kerrigan and
Christopher J. Brasco, "[i]ndustry's message to Congress became quite
clear: business was no longer willing to invest in CRADAs unless rights
88
under such agreements were clearly defined and easily secured."
Congress responded by clarifying the rights obtained by private industry
collaborations through CRADA use. 89 Congress safeguarded public benefit
from the technology through use of the access provisions such as "marchin" rights. 90 Industry has responded positively to the decrease in negotiation
time by heavily using CRADAs to fund research and transfer technology
from government laboratories to the public sector. 91
The second key distinction is the CDC model licensing agreement
requires adherence to a Commercial Development Plan as required by 37
C.F.R. § 404.5.92 The license states that "Licensee shall use its reasonable
best efforts to introduce the Licensed Products into the commercial market
or apply the Licensed Processes to commercial use as soon as practicable.
'Reasonable best efforts' for the purpose of this provision shall include, but
93
not be limited to, adherence to the Commercial Development Plan."
While the contents of the Commercial Development Plan are negotiable, the
plan's existence requires the licensee to be upfront about intentions for the
technology. The license then requires the licensee bring the technology to
"practical application within a reasonable time as specified in the license,"
and also "continue to make the benefits of the invention reasonably

86
87
88
89
90

Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, supra note 84.
Watkins, supra note 64.
Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 285.

Id.
Id.

91 Id. at 286.
92 37 C.F.R. § 404.5(a)(1) (2008) ("A license may be granted only if the applicant has
supplied the Federal agency with a satisfactory plan for development or marketing of the
invention, or both, and with information about the applicant's capability to fulfill the plan.

The plan for a non-exclusive research license may be limited to describing the research
phase of development.").

93 CDC Model Licensing Agreement § 801, http://www.cdc.gov/od/science/techTran/
forms/pla-non.pdf (last visited October 22, 2008).
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accessible to the public." 94 The CDC is legally enabled to terminate the
plan
license if the licensee does not fulfill its commitments outlined in the
95
use."
public
for
requirements
meet
to
necessary
or if "[t]ermination is
There are a few other areas where the restrictions on federal
government labs are noticeable. One is the requirements for public notice
imposed on federal agencies by the Bayh-Dole Act. 96 Government owned
and operated laboratories are required to give notice of available
technologies to the public several months before the institution can license a
technology-a cumbersome requirement. 9 7 It is interesting to note that
these restrictions likely prohibit government laboratories from structuring a
deal like the Gilead-Emory deal. For the Gilead deal, Emory took the
stream of royalty payments for the technology as an upfront payment. The
FTTA caps the maximum amount of royalty payments an inventor can
receive at $150,000.98

III. POLICY CONSIDERATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
The most important point to make clear is that it is difficult to make
"generalizations concerning developing countries, which have widely
differing economic conditions." 99 Regulations in these countries will need
to look different than regulations in the United States; for example, "[t]he
US is a country where entrepreneurs can find venture capital [and] where
there are patent attorneys with the skills to help with patent prosecution,"
while "in developing economies there may be limited licensing
opportunities within the domestic market."10 0 Even within these countries,
there are various different types of institutions and government styles. The
United States has small businesses, universities, government owned and
operated laboratories, and government owned and contractor operated
laboratories, and has a federalist, democratic, capitalist government. Some
developing countries have institutions like universities and government
laboratories, but many do not have the same federal and state structure as
94 37 C.F.R. § 404.5(b)(5) (2008).
95 37 C.F.R. § 404.5(b)(8)(i)-(ii) (2008).
96 See Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 280-81 ("The Act further placed limitations

on the licensing of government-owned technology by subjecting such procedures to lengthy
public notice requirements and by granting only government-owned, government-operated
laboratories (GOGOs) the authority to license such inventions.").
97 See 37 C.F.R. §§ 404.4, 404.7 (2008).
98 See 15 U.S.C. § 3710(c)(3) (2006); see also ORTA HANDBOOK, supra note 36, at 7-6.
99 Mireles, supra note 5, at 532.
100 Gail E. Evans, Strategic Patent Licensing for Public Research Organizations:
Deploying Restriction and Reservation Clauses to Promote Medical R&D in Developing
Countries, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 191 (2008).
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the United States and their political systems range from democratic to
socialist to communist. The need for different strands of legislation in the
United States for its different types of legislation emphasizes the need for
developing country governments to closely scrutinize how Bayh-Dole's
provision would operate within their specialized structure, rather than
bluntly adopting Bayh-Dole.
A recent effort to develop Bayh-Dole-like legislation for South Africa
is representative of how a developing country could begin to analyze its
specific needs. 10 1 This effort set out six guiding principles specific to the
needs of South Africa to guide in creation of South Africa's technology
transfer legislation.' 0 2 These principles are as follows:
1. A consistent approach to ensure protection of IP developed with
public funds; 2. Benchmark against good practice globally and
contextualised for national and regional efficacy; 3. Identify key rights,
functions & obligations; 4. Good balance between incentives and
control; 5. Certainty in terms of publicly financed IP; 6. Must not hinder
03
private-public collaborations. 1
These guidelines highlight some of the key issues that were important to
South Africa in drafting legislation. If other developing countries were to
lay out their principles, some may be very similar to South Africa's and
others may be very different, just as the United States has created different
regulations for its institutions. Countries in mid-development phase, similar
to South Africa, with strong universities and increasing government funding
towards research may have similar principles, while less-developed
countries, without the strength of South Africa's underlying structure,
would have a drastically different set of guidelines. It is likely that if these
less-developed countries actually laid out their guidelines, they would opt
04
out of enacting Bayh-Dole legislation completely.1
Governments will need to contextualize Bayh-Dole to the needs of
developing countries. Just as Congress sought the same basic effect in
legislation affecting both universities and government laboratories in the
United States, to obtain commercialization of government funded
technology in developing countries, their governments will need to draft
101 McLean Sibanda, Executive Dir. Innovation Fund of S. Afr., , Patents and Their Role
in Development and Global Health, Presentation for Emory Law School Seminar (Nov. 5,
2008) (on file with author).
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 See So

et al., supra note 4, at 2078 (2008) (reviewing some of the general needs of
less-developed countries and concluding that Bayh-Dole would be more detrimental than
beneficial).
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legislation carefully tailored to fit the particular needs of that country, its
structure of government, and the structure of its institutions. This Part
discusses some key provisions that could be included in a strategy adopted
by a developing country. This Part is not intended to be conclusive of all the
strategies a developing country could use, and is merely meant to suggest
areas of flexibility in the original Bayh-Dole legislation that could be used
to tailor it to a specific country's needs. First, it examines the core benefit
of Bayh-Dole that a majority of developing countries adopting similar
legislation should preserve. It then looks at the potential for licensing
preferences to aid the attainment of country goals and priorities. It then
addresses the potential for developing countries to use CRADAs to reduce
negotiation costs and clarify the rights of collaborators, with a special
emphasis on the potential for private-public partnerships as collaborators.
Finally, it examines suggested solutions to problems with technology
transfer within developing countries, including management of limited
resources in the technology transfer sphere, prevention of an anti-commons
effect, and an adequate provision of access to essential medicines for the
country's low-income population.
A.

Clarificationof PropertyRights and Ownership

While some have argued that Bayh-Dole was not as substantial an
incentive of economic growth as some have claimed it is, one resounding
benefit of Bayh-Dole in the context of its adoption by developing countries
is the clarification it provides of ownership of inventions. 105 It has been
noted that Stevenson-Wydler's initial inadequacy was primarily caused by
its failure to "give federal laboratories clear legal authority" to enter
beneficial licensing agreements for the transfer of its technology. 10 6 As a
result, in "the seven years following the enactment of Stevenson-Wydler,
the Government entered into only thirty-four technology transfer
agreements."' 1 7 Along with the invention of the CRADA came clear
authority for government agencies to enter into technology transfer
agreements.10 8 It is clear from this example that legislation enacted in
developing countries should clearly, explicitly grant authority to research
institutions to own the products of their research, and enter into agreements
105 See Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 278 ("The Bayh-Dole Act fundamentally
served to create clarity of ownership of inventions created in the public sector with public
funds. This has been the major positive effect of the Act that should be emulated in national
policy."); So et al., supra note 4, at 2078 (arguing that Bayh-Dole was not as successful as
suggested, but did provide clarity of ownership).
106 Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 281.
107 Id.

108 See id.at 282 ("The CRADA for the first time gave federal laboratories clear
authority to enter into technology transfer agreements.").

Spring 2009]

AMERICAN MODELS OF TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

to license the technology. Guiding principles one, three, and five of the
South African guiding principles primarily focus on building clarity of
ownership and rights into South African technology transfer law. 10 9 The
existence of clear ownership regulations reinforce guiding principles two
and four, by allowing for clarity of benchmarks, and creating a steady
framework where balancing of incentives and control can occur.1 l1 This is
the primary reason why Bayh-Dole is such an attractive option for
developing and developed countries, and is why more developing countries
should continue to adopt similar legislation.
On the other hand, developing countries seeking to adopt similar
legislation in order to build their economies, rather than merely to clarify
ownership of rights, might need to adjust their goals. Governments should
carefully study and understand their economy and the direction it is headed
to determine if the acceleration possibly provided by Bayh-Dole
clarification of ownership would have an effect. Commentators note that
"university licensing offices barely break even" and that technology transfer
' I
licensing "accounts for less than 5% of total academic research dollars." I
This resulted in concern of the "anti-commons" effect discussed later and
has caused top American universities "to recognize the difficulties that
overly aggressive proprietary behavior can engender."' 12 Despite these
concerns, "it is rare that technologies develop without some form of
exclusive protection" and because it is important that technology reach the
marketplace, "patent exclusivity is often justified."' 13 Since clarification of
technology ownership and support of technological innovation increases
commercialization of government-funded inventions and also increases a
country's economic growth, developing countries should still consider
adoption of Bayh-Dole legislation with appropriate country-specific
safeguards. 114

109 See Sibanda, supra note 101 (discussing guiding principles for South African BayhDole-like legislation).
I 10 See id. (discussing guiding principles for South African Bayh-Dole-like legislation).
III So et al., supra note 4, at 2079.
112 Id.
113 Bess-Carolina Dolmo, Note, Examining Global Access to Essential Pharmaceuticals
in the Face of Patent Protection Rights: The South African Example, 7 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 137, 154 (2001).
114 See So et al., supra note 4, at 2082 ("While policies supporting technological

innovation and diffusion contribute to economic growth and development, the appropriate
sets of policies to harness public sector R&D are highly context-specific.").
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Utilizing Licensing Preferences to FurtherCountry Objectives

B.

Another benefit of Bayh-Dole and Stevenson-Wydler may be the
preference for small businesses and domestic manufacturing. 115
Development of domestic industry and production of technology designed
for local needs is an important part of building technology as a force in a
country's economy. 1 16 However, it has been acknowledged that many low
income countries do not yet have the capacity for much domestic
manufacturing and this provision would need to be modified in preference
to domestic benefits rather than manufacturing. 1 17 Michael S. Mireles has
proposed a tiered approach for developing countries: first giving preference
to licensees that would do research and development in the country,
manufacturing in the country, and use the technology for the country's
benefit; second giving preference to licensees that would manufacture in the
country and use the technology for the country's benefit; and finally, if
neither of those could be met, giving preference to licensees that would use
8
the technology to substantially benefit the country."1
The South Africa project used preferences in another unique way: as a
way to help correct for social injustices within the country. Besides
including a similar small business preference, the legislation also included a
preference for "black-owned" companies.1 9 South Africa has a history of
economic, political, and legal discrimination of its black citizens.' 20 This
makes the potential for empowerment that could occur through having a
preference for black owned businesses very attractive to South African
policy makers looking to right their country's wrongs. There is no real
enforcement mechanism for this preference, but its mere existence will
likely have an effect on technology transfer practice in South Africa.
Developing countries facing similar social injustice situations should
consider the potential effect technology transfer preferences could have on
correcting these problems. Perhaps countries with a history of suppression
of women could make the bold move of expressing a preference for female
owned and operated companies, since "putting power" in the hands of
women is the best way to improving their lives within a country. 12 1 The

115 See Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 277.
116

Id.

117 Mireles, supra note 5, at 543.
118 Id. at 543-44.
119 See Sibanda, supra note 101.
120 See generally Kevin Hopkins, Assessing the World's Response to Apartheid A
HistoricalAccount of InternationalLaw and its Part in the South African Transformation,
U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV., Special Issue 2002, at 241.
121 See Olivia Wood, Ten Worst Countriesfor Women, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 8, 2008, at
AAI (discussing how advocates agree that "[p]utting power in women's hands is the biggest

challenge for improving their lives in every country, advocates agree.").
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creativity and political will of the country's policymakers are the primary
limitations for the possibilities for this type of provision.
C. Adoption of CRADA-Like Provisions in Government Operated
Laboratories
Legislation permitting the use of CRADAs may also be an innovative
step for some developing countries to consider, especially if they have
many government owned and operated institutions. While some would
argue that this would cause an unnecessary restriction of freedom to
collaboration, a proposition needing further investigation, legislation
specifically encouraging external funding and collaboration with research
institutions may be beneficial. In fact, corporations lobbied for the United
States to pass the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of
1995 because they were dissatisfied with the long negotiation period
122
involved with entering CRADAs caused by the uncertainty of terms.
Requiring that institutions who heavily contribute to research receive a
primary say in licensing decisions could be a creative way to involve
public-private partnerships in the innovation process. Public-private
partnerships vary greatly amongst different countries, but many
countries, 12 3 including South Africa, have strong humanitarian-focused
public-private institutions that the government wants to encourage, rather
24
than discourage. 1
A CRADA-like provision could require that research institutions give
external institutions who invest funding an option for an exclusive or nonexclusive license, which public-private partnerships could use to promote
developing country goals and humanitarian purposes. 125 The benefit of this
type of requirement is that it would clarify and decrease the cost of the
negotiation process. This would allow humanitarian-oriented organizations,
which may not have the resources to carry out an expensive negotiation
process, to get a substantial benefit for contribution of resources. However,
it may have to be specifically limited to humanitarian-oriented corporations
122 Kerrigan & Brasco, supra note 14, at 285 ("Before the Act, the laws were so flexible
regarding the intellectual property rights of parties to a CRADA that laborious negotiations
were necessary every time a CRADA was proposed. For example, at the 1995 hearings on.
technology transfer, a DuPont executive testified that his company's negotiations for a single

CRADA often took more than one year. Industry's message to Congress became quite clear:
business was no longer willing to invest in CRADAs unless rights under such agreements

were clearly defined and easily secured.").
123 Davison, supra note 6.

124 See Sibanda, supra note 101 (stating that ideal licensing regulations "[m]ust not
hinder private-public collaborations").
125 See generally Lipkus, supra note 50 (discussing the potential for public-private

partnerships to address neglected diseases in the context of America's modem intellectual
property environment, which includes CRADAs as an integral part).
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because otherwise corporate licensees may dictate the use of university
inventions. This danger is one issue that the new South African legislation
was aiming to avoid by "prevent[ing] industry from negotiating sole
ownership rights over research it has contributed little funding to, and ...
enabl[ing] the government to negotiate access to inventions for the public
good, such as new HIV/AIDS drugs,"' 126 and accordingly, a CRADA-like
provision may need to be narrowly drafted to avoid this problem.
As an example, the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization
(GAVI Alliance) is a public-private partnership working to promote
immunization in over seventy of the most impoverished countries.12 7 Two
key features of the GAVI Alliance are that it has developed unique and
effective funding strategies and its members include governments of
developing countries. 128 Access to willing foreign government
participation, increased funding for neglected diseases, and access to health
data of developing countries are all important resources that a humanitarianoriented public-private partnership, like GAVI, could provide as
contributions to research institution projects focusing on a neglected
disease. Though GAVI may not have the resources to negotiate beneficial
collaboration
agreements,
CRADA-like
regulations
streamlining
humanitarian collaborations with research institutions may allow GAVI to
more easily contribute to research, with a promise that it would gain control
of the licensing for the new technology that is developed. This power would
ensure that GAVI is able to create a license that would be the most
beneficial for humanitarian purposes. Despite this possible creative use,
CRADAs have been a successful technology transfer device 129 and are a
potential provision to be considered by developing countries when creating
new technology transfer legislation, as long as they are not used to
discourage public-private partnerships from contributing to research. The
adoption of a CRADA-type provision depends on the particular structure of
the country's government and institutions. Governments with institutions
facing slow or expensive negotiations for outside funding, or bogged down
by heavy regulations, may particularly want to consider a CRADA-like
provision.
D. Central Management of Technology Transfer Offices
Many developing countries do not have a high percentage of experts
in the area of intellectual property and technology transfer that would allow
126 Renssen, supra note 17.
127 See GAVI Alliance, GAVI Alliance Fact Sheet (2008), http://www.gavialliance.org/
resources/15 EN Achievements 1_final_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2008).
128 See id.
129 See Duncombe, supra note 49, at 610.
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every university or government laboratory to have a high-functioning
technology transfer office. One proposed solution, due to a scarcity of
intellectual property experts, is creating regional or technology specific
technology transfer centers in a developing country, rather than
institutional-based centers. 130 Some scholars have even pushed for the
adoption of a national system that oversees research and technology
transfer. 13 1 While the national approach may be too much, its been argued
that the regional approach "affords economies of scale in sustaining the
large costs and limited revenues of patent portfolios and the ability to invest
the profits from any "blockbuster" inventions in the broader technology
transfer infrastructure. The structure also has the potential to sustain a
"commons" of technologies in specific areas by aggregating IP and
managing unified portfolios of technologies under a common set of
objectives."' 132 However, commentators point out that institutional
technology transfer offices do much more than simply managing patents
and leaving at least limited responsibilities in the hands of institutions may
133
be important.
As an example of a country utilizing a national intellectual property
management regime, Nigeria's National Office for Technology Acquisition
and Promotion has been "mandated to assist in the commercialisation of
R&D results and to promote the IP system as a source of generating
income."' 134 The office is involved on a national level with
"Evaluation/Registration of Technology Transfer Agreements, Promotion
of Intellectual Property, Technology Advisory and Support Services,
Commercialization of R&D Results, Research Industry Linkage, Production
of Compenduim Management Information System, Publication of Project
Profiles on R&D Results." 135 This office is able to coordinate the research
and development efforts of the country's universities, including training

130 See Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 275.
131 See generally Lorelei Ritchie de Larena, The Price of Progress: Are Universities
Adding to the Cost?, 43 HoUS. L. REV. 1373 (2007) (arguing that the United States should
establish a national system due to the failures and misuses of technology transfer by
universities).
132 Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 275.

133 Id. at 276 (citing Rosemary Wolson, Intellectual Property Tools, Innovation and
Commercialisation of R&D: Options to Assist Developing Countries in Positioning
Themselves to Reap the Benefits of a Stronger Intellectual Property Regime, with Special
Reference to the Role of Intellectual Property Management in Research Organizations,

"Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs), Innovation, and Sustainable Development" in Eastern
and Southern Africa (Cape Town, South Africa 2004).
134 Davison, supra note 6.
135 Obi C. Adiuku-Brown, Executive Officer of Nat'l Office for Tech. Acquisition &
Promotion, Welcome to NOTAP, http://www.notap.gov.ng/about.php (last visited Mar. 22,
2009).
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leaders of localized technology transfer offices. 136 Countries with lower
levels of funding and few trained intellectual property experts should
consider this approach. The possibilities of the structuring of the technology
transfer program are nearly limitless and governments should carefully
analyze the needs of their country's research institutions.
E. Prevention of an "Anti-Commons" Effect
The Federal Circuit recently held that virtually no research exemption
137
exists in America, in either universities or government laboratories.
Commentators such as Rebecca Eisenberg have strongly argued that
America, without a research exemption, issues patents so frequently and
easily that it has inhibited research institutions from development of further
innovation and technology because advancement would mean infringement.
138 This has been termed the "tragedy of the anti-commons." 139 Michael
Mireles argues that adoption of a Bayh-Dole type of provision in other
developed countries, such as Japan and the United Kingdom, could result in
to the development of beneficial
over-patenting and other impediments
140
research within the United States.
Developing countries, when examining their particular needs, may
want to be careful to avoid the "anti-commons" problem due to an increased
need for access to essential medicines in lower income countries. 14 1 When
research institutions leave technology in the public domain, it is easily
available for generic manufactures to sell at an affordable price, but the
anti-commons effect creates a lack of technology in the public domain and
drives up the price of technology. 142 One suggested solution to the anticommons problem is to require research institutions to decide in advance
which funding agreements will result in patentable technology and which
will not. 14 3 Critics dismiss this idea on the grounds that it is unworkable to
136 Nat'l Office for Tech. Acquisition & Promotion, Establishment of IPTTOs,
http://www.notap.gov.ng/ipttoindex.php (last visited Mar. 22, 2009).
137 See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
138 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 28; see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 310
(2003).
139 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 28.
140 See Mireles, supra note 15, at 276-82.
141 Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 281 ("Finally, the potential to block research
because of problems in access to research tools appears to be an unintended, but actual,
result of the Bayh-Dole Act. This plays out in terms of directly slowing or stopping
fundamental research but may also prevent research targeted towards non-commercial or
humanitarian applications of technology.").
142 Id.
143 Rai & Eisenberg, supra note 138, at 294 (proposal to implement this solution by
eliminating the "exceptional circumstances" provision of Bayh-Dole).
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144
expect anyone to make that type of determination.
Another suggested solution viewed favorably by scholars is the
inclusion of at least a limited research exemption in the legislation passed in
developing countries. 14 5 One option is to require that "[a]ll researchers
whose work is supported by federal funds should have a limited, royaltyfree license to make and use for research purposes all inventions developed
with federal funds." 146 This option essentially creates a governmental
patent pool that gives researchers supported by governmental funds access
to other inventions funded by governmental funding.147 A variation of this

approach is to require "those receiving government research funding ...

to

consider the option of licensing patented inventions to a 'technology trust,'
that is, a commons that would ensure designated inventions remained
148
available to all interested parties on predetermined terms."
While this is beneficial in the sense that it allows further research and
potential creation of new life-saving technologies, the downside is that it
creates uncertainty and drastically reduces the value of licensing
agreements. 149 This is because a large pool of researchers could use a
technology for free and find a new technology that might replace the one
the licensee has paid to license, making the license nearly worthless. 150 One
way to limit the effect of this would be to decrease the size or types of
technology allowed in the patent pool. For example, the free license granted
by the government could be limited to researchers using the free license to
work on neglected diseases. It is important to note that all these types of
patenting pooling create difficult antitrust and economic issues, 151
including risks of collusion, limited utility, or high costs. 15 2 Due to the
See Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: IncreasingAccess to Government-Funded

144

Inventions Under the Bayh-Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. Sci. & TECH. 393, 440-42 (2006) ("[T]he
Rai and Eisenberg proposal would fail in implementation.").
145 Mireles, supra note 5, at 531 (2007) ("Some provisions that may be modified by
developing countries include a research exemption to increase access to government-funded
inventions.").
146 Id. at 534 (quoting Pulsinelli, supra note 144, at 442-43) (citing Boettiger & Bennett,
supra note 12, at 278 ("Development of new policies should consider the inclusion of a wellreasoned research exemption for university researchers' use of proprietary IP.")).
147 Pulsinelli, supra note 144, at 442-46 (discussing the implementation of this type of
government patent pool).
So et al., supra note 4, at 2081.

148

Pulsinelli, supra note 144, at 446 ("Under my proposed Bayh-Dole license, however,
[the licensee]'s power would have been greatly diminished.").
150 Id. (using stem-cell research as an example).
149

151

See generally Philip B. Nelson, Patent Pools: An Economic Assessment of Current

Law and Policy, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 539 (2007) (discussing the anti-trust and economic
difficulties arising from patent pools).
152 Bradley J. Levang, Comment, Evaluating the Use of Patent Poolsfor Biotechnology:
A Refutation to the USPTO White Paper Concerning Biotechnology Patent Pools, 19 SANTA

CLARA

COMPUTER

&

HIGH

TECH.

L.J. 229, 251

(2002) ("The risks of collusion.
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increased need for access to new life-saving medicine in developing
countries, policy-makers in these countries should seriously consider a
limited expansion of the research exemption allowed in Bayh-Dole, but
they will also have to remember the countervailing dangers.
F. Provide a Suitable Access Licensing Provision
Advocates in the United States are strongly pushing for a reevaluation
of the access provisions in Bayh-Dole. When developing countries try to
contextualize this legislation to their own needs, high levels of low-income
individuals and high rates of disease may pronounce this issue. As
discussed previously, "march-in rights" and "exceptional circumstances"
provisions have largely been unsuccessful in the United States.153 "Marchin rights" may very likely be more effective in a country whose government
is more willing to intervene than the U.S. government. In fact, South Africa
decided to reserve "walk-in rights" for the government to license a
technology to a third party if the original licensee fails to use the license or
fails to disclose the license to the state. 154 In these cases, hopefully the
country's governments will be willing to intervene when needed, but due to
the failure of these provision in the United States, developing countries,
especially those with federalist governments that are similarly hesitant to
intervene with industry, may want to consider alternative legislative
approaches to providing access to life-saving technologies.
One alternative approach to solve these issues is to work within the
framework of the licensing statutes by creating licensing language favorable
to the underprivileged. 155 As an example, multiple scholars have pointed to
licensing language developed by the Public Intellectual Property Resource
for Agriculture and Universities Allied for Essential Medicines designed to
ensure that universities and other research institutions reserve rights to
allow access for "humanitarian commercial development that benefits the
poor and underserved." 156 Commentators have noted that allowing research
institutions to reserve rights would dramatically undercut the worth of the
disagreements, high costs, and limited utility will prevent many patent pools from being
widely adopted by biotechnology companies.").
153 Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 279 ("Enforcement of compliance with the
legislation may need to diverge from Bayh-Dole's 'march-in' rights. 'March-in' rights under
Bayh-Dole has not been employed as a mechanism for enforcement of compliance with the
legislation. In addition, the inclusion of 'march-in' rights has the potential for creating
uncertainty in IP rights ownership and therefore may discourage industry involvement. New
policies should carefully balance the relative strength of 'march-in' rights and the

uncertainty they create for technology commercialization.").
154 See Sibanda, supra note 101 (discussing South Africa's "walk-in" rights).
155 See Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 265 (providing examples of how "the
patenting and licensing discretion allowed by Bayh-Dole can be used strategically").
156 Mireles, supra note 5, at 532-33 (citing Boettiger & Bennett, supra note 12, at 265).
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patent when the product's main market is humanitarian uses. 15 7
Accordingly, the researchers who seek to do research for low-income
populations would have to operate with the knowledge that they would not
recuperate any of the costs of eventually marketing the invention. Proposed
regulatory schemes should seek to avoid punishing licensees willing to take
a risk on drugs aimed at developing country markets. This is also the
downside of the "negative milestones" approach that some commentators
have suggested, which takes money away from the licensee if they fail to
achieve certain commercialization goals by specific dates laid out in the
license. 158
Requiring the use of legally enforceable Commercial Development
Plans may be a more successful strategy than reserving rights to research
institutions for humanitarian use. Requiring Commercial Development
Plans as is done for exclusive or partially exclusive licenses in government
agency licensing 159 would grant a licensee full rights to the technology, but
would provide research institutions a mechanism for holding corporations
accountable to proposed access plans. Legislation could even require that
Commercial Development Plans for technology that may have a potential
life-saving effect include a provision for how the licensee is going to make
the technology available to the low-income population. This is favored by
scholars, who argue that "at the very least, when inventions have
foreseeable applications in resource-poor regions, a plan for access in those
regions should be explicitly incorporated into technology licensing." Some
would push for broader provisions, applicable to all licenses resulting from
160
government-funded research.
Under a Commercial Development Plan approach, if the licensee
failed to take reasonable efforts to see this plan through, the research
institution is not left, as was the case with Emory, with media and public
pressure as its enforcement mechanism. Instead, the research institution
would have the power to void the license and issue a new license to party
who would provide access. While this does create some uncertainty and
decrease the value of the license, the fact that an industry partner sets the
terms would likely make this an attractive option. While similar to "march157 Id.at 533.

158 Id. at 536 ("The use of negative milestones would also be helpful to ensure that
technology that is exclusively licensed will be commercialized.").
159 35 U.S.C. § 209(a)(3) (2006) ("A Federal agency may grant an exclusive or partially
exclusive license on a federally owned invention . . . only if

. .

.the applicant makes a

commitment to achieve practical application of the invention within a reasonable time,
which time may be extended by the agency upon the applicant's request and the applicant's
demonstration that the refusal of such extension would be unreasonable.").
160 See So et al., supra note 4, at 2081 ("Licenses to government-funded inventions
should presumptively include access-oriented licensing provisions that address humanitarian
needs in other countries.").
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in rights," this option would give enforcement power to research
institutions, which have closer ties to the licensee and the technology and
may be in a better position to ensure that provision of access. This approach
would also require upfront honesty about provisions for access to lowincome populations during the licensing process, which may have helped
with Emory's Gilead situation and address the transparency concerns raised
by scholars. 16 1 This approach would also provide a safeguard for countries
who would have to market to the industry outside of their country to utilize
the Bayh-Dole framework. These countries could use Commercial
Development Plans to require a specific plan to allow the the country
reasonably priced access to the technology, with the threat of withdrawal of
license if the foreign industry licensee fails to return a benefit to the
country. Accordingly, developing countries, seeking to balance
encouragement of technology transfer as a keystone of their economy and
assurance of access to life-saving technology for the underprivileged,
should consider this approach.
The required Commercial Development Plan approach has gained
some foothold in the United States outside of federal agencies: a recent
California state agency, the California Institute for Regenerative Medicine
(CIRM), has utilized this approach in the progressive new regulation it
adopted into state law regarding transfer of technology discovered using
funding granted by the CIRM. 162 CIRM has applied this regulation to
exclusive licenses with non-profit organizations and for-profits
organizations. 16 3 The provision requires that licenses "shall include terms
for commercial development plans to bring the invention to practical
application" which includes "commercial development milestones and
benchmarks so that development can be assessed and monitored. ' 164 The
regulation then requires research institutions to monitor the achievement of
benchmarks and commercial development activities of licensees and gives
research institutions authority to "take administrative action to modify or
terminate license rights where necessary.' 165 CIRM's regulations provide a
model for designing this type of provision in the future.
Another suggestion has been to adopt the "open licensing"
approach. 166 This approach, like licensing practices on free software, "uses
161 See id. ("The legislation should ensure transparency in the patenting and licensing of
publicly funded research.").
162 See CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100306, 100406 (2009) (governing non-profits).
163 See id.
164 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, §§ 100306(c), 100406(c)(3) (2009).
165 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 100306(g)-(h) (2009).
166 See generally Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open
Licensing Approachfor University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031 (2005); see
also Mireles, supra note 5, at 533 n.27 (mentioning the Kapczynski "open licensing"
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proprietary rights to secure freedom for an open class of potential users,
rather than to secure exclusivity for a closed class of licensees." 16 7 It
encourages research institutions to use what it calls an "Equitable Access
License" which basically aims to allow generic competition to lower the
cost in developing markets through enabling the licensee to utilize the
technology, but specifically securing "freedom to operate" for generic
manufacturers. 16 8 Developing countries must balance the downside, a
decrease in the value of licenses aimed at humanitarian or developing
markets, by attempting to grant "fair royalties" to the licensee for allowing
the open licensing. 169
CONCLUSION

The needs of developing countries are unique and diverse with
particular government and research institution structures. The United States
has responded to different types of institutions by creating technology
transfer legislation specifically adapted to that institution's particular needs.
While two lines of legislation governing government laboratories and
universities both seek to encourage the commercialization of the technology
resulting from government funding, each has unique provisions, discussed
in this Comment, which tailor the regulations to meet the particular needs of
each institution in reaching the objective of commercialization.
If developing countries are seeking to pass legislation that attempts to
harness the beneficial effect of giving research institutions clarification of
ownership and authority to license technology funded by the government,
these countries need to realize the highly specified nature of this legislation.
These countries will need to closely examine the direction their economy is
heading, the structure of their government, and the primary type of research
institution within their countries. These countries will also need to weigh
the benefits and pitfalls of the American legislation and also examine the
provisions specially designed for particular institutions. For countries with
highly regulated institutions, more closely compared to government owned
and operated laboratories in the United States, provisions like CRADAs,
which lower negotiation time and costs for outside input into the institution,
and Commercial Development Plans, which encourage transparency in
negotiations and clear objective for use by the public, could be beneficial.
For countries with institutions similar to American universities, less
approach as a possible solution to the problems caused by applying Bayh-Dole to developing

countries).
167 Kapczynski et al., supra note 166, at 1090.
168 Id. at 1090-94.
169 So et al., supra note 4, at 2081 ("One such provision is an open license for production
and sale of end products in (or to) developing countries in exchange for a fair royalty.").
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restrictive legislation may be preferred.
The unique needs of developing countries will depend on the country,
but many will want to create modifications to the Bayh-Dole legislation that
helps to contextualize it to a country facing higher disease and poverty
rates. This may include different utilization of licensing preferences to
further particularized national objectives or possibly more allowance of
research exemptions to help spur burgeoning research sectors. It may also
include special structuring of technology transfer guidance, perhaps
regional or national oversight of the commercialization process, in order to
ensure the licensees uses technology for the public's benefit. Finally, it may
include access provisions better calculated to work in the specific country,
whether this involves "march-in rights" paired with increased governmental
willingness to intervene or other innovative strategies, such as mandatory
creation of a plan for use of the technology for humanitarian purposes.
Whatever provisions the country ends up adopting, if a country
decides to enact legislation modeled on Bayh-Dole, the country must
carefully study the particular needs of its own country. Even within the
United States there is diversity in the regulations governing how the
technology resulting from government-funded research is commercialized.
The individual needs of the unique institutions found in the United States
and the special way each institution interacts with the structure of the U.S.
government is the basis for this diversity. Likewise, developing countries
must become acutely aware of their form of government and the institutions
in their country. Instead of bluntly adopting Bayh-Dole as it exists in the
United States, these countries must specially tailor their legislation to
properly regulate their varied research institutions in order to attempt to
achieve their country's distinctive national goals and objectives.

